

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8084
AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE GQWYT
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1297

EXDIS

FOR SECRETARY
DEPT PLS PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT CARTER
CAPETOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O.11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PDEV TZ
SUBJECT: RHODESIA: NYERERE ON FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS' DECISIONS

REF: DAR ES SALAAM 1293

1. SUMMARY: IN HIS SECOND REPORT ON RESULTS OF FRONT LINE
PRESIDENTS' MEETING EVENING MARCH 26, PRESIDENT NYERERE
RETREATED TO INSISTING THAT, WHILE HE IS STILL PREPARED TO
SUPPORT ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE, A SEPERATE FOLLOW-UP ON
MALT MEETING BETWEEN PF AND UK MUST PRECEDE ALL PARTIES ASSEMBLY,
EVEN IF ONLY BY FORTY-EIGHT HOURS. AMB YOUNG STRESSED MANY AND
SERIOUS PROBLEMS THIS WOULD POSE FOR WEST. NYERERE ACCEPTED THIS

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RESPONSE IN UNDERSTANDING MANNER. HOWEVER, HE INSISTED THAT HE HAD
GOVE OVER THINGS CAREFULLY WITH HIS COLLEAGUES (FL) AND "CLIENTS"
(PF) AND WAS NOT GOING TO BE PUT ON DEFENSIVE. HE HOPED WE COULD ALL
FIND WAY TO MOVE AHEAD ON POLITICAL FRONT. IF NOT, ONLY ALTERNATIVE
WAS BLOODY AND PROTRACTED WAR. HE WAS STILL REPLYING TO PRESIDENT
CARTER TO HELP HIM FIND A BETTER SOLUTION. OUR INTITAL THOUGHT IS
THAT WE SHOULD SWITCH EMPHASIS TO NAMIBIA AND GIVE THE RHODESIAN POT

A LITTLE MORE TIME TO SIMMER BEFORE ACCEPTING OR REJECTING NYERERE'S APPROACH. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESIDENT NYERERE ASKED AMBASSADOR YOUNG AND ME TO HIS MSASANI HOUSE EVEING OF EASTER SUNDAY, MARCH 26, TO FIVE US FINAL REPORT ON FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS' MEETING WHICH ENDED THAT AFTERNOON. UK REPRESENTATIVE WAS NOT RPT NOT PRESENT ON THIS OCCASION. ONLY OTHERS WERE TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR TO UN SLAIM AND PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY MDEE. SESSION LASTED ONE HOUR AND IT WAS AGREED TO SPEAK FRANKLY AND NOT TAKE NOTES FOR MUCH OF MEETING.

3. NYERERE BEGAN BY STRESSING THAT THE FRONT LINE MEETING HAD BEEN A GOOD ONE AND THAT HE WAS WELL SATISFIED WITH IT. THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS NOW UNDERSTOOD A LOT DHAT THEY HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD AT MALTA. THEIR PROBLEMS WITH THE UK COULD BE TAKEN CARE OF RELATIVELY SIMPLY AND EASILY. HOWEVER, A FOLLOW-UP ON THE MALTA MEETING BETWEEN THE PF AND THE UK MUST PRECEDE AN ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE, EVEN IF ONLY BY FORTY-EIGHT HOURS. OTHERWISE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT PR WAS JOINING SALISBURY AGREEMENT. THE PF AND OTHERS WOULD NEVER BELIEVE THAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN HAD NOT BEEN ABANDONED. THIS, NYERERE SAID, WAS HIS PRINCIPAL MESSAGE FOR US TO PASS TO PRESIDENT CARTER.

4. AMBASSADOR YOUNG, MAKING POINT THAT HE WAS SPEAKING FRNAKLY AND AS A FRIEND RATHER THAN A NEGOTIATOR, LAID OUT ALL THE PROBLEMS THIS APPROACH WOULD GIVE US, AND, HE BELIVED, THE UK--WHICH
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HAD TO BEAR THE BRUNT AT HOME AND ABROAD OF ITS TREMENDOUS UNDERTAKING ON RHODESIA. IF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT BROKE DOWN, THINGS MIGHT BE EASIER, BUT RIGHT NOW WE FACED MAJOR LIMITATIONS. WE COULD NOT EXPECT FROM SOUTH AFRICA THE HELP WE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GET AGAINST SMITH BEFORE OUR RELATIONS WITH PRETORIA HAD DETERIORATED TO THEIR PRESENT STATE.

5. YOUNG WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PULLING AWAY FROM SMITH BY MORE RESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS OF HIS INTERNAL POWER STRUCTURE, WHICH COULD REASONABLY HAVE BEEN ANTICIPATED BEFORE THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT, COULD NOT NOW BE RELIED UPON. MONEY AND OIL COULD BE POWERFUL INSTRUMENTS OF PRESSURE BUT THEY TOOK A LONG TIME TO TAKE EFFECT AND INVOLVED A LOT OF PEOPLE. PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN HAD NEVER HAD A MORE FORMIDABLE ARRAY OF PROBLEMS BEFORE THAN THAN THEY DID NOW. IF AN ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE WERE TO SUCCEED, WE HAD TO BE IN A POSITION TO PUSH IT HARD. IF IT HAD TO BE PRECEDED BY "A RETURN TO MALTA," YOUNG WAS NOT SURE WE COULD PUSH THAT HARD.

6. NYERERE LISTENED CAREFULLY, ACCEPTING THE VALIDITY OF EACH POINT AS IT WAS MADE. HE CONCEDED THAT ALL OF US HAD TO FACE POLITICAL REALITY. HIS REALITY WAS: "HOW CAN YOU IGNORE MALTA WITHOUT

ABANDONING THE A-AP?" AND "ARE THE US AND THE UK STILL BEHIND THE A-AP?" NYERERE ADDED THAT THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT EFFORTS DID NOT STOP FOR MALTA, AND MALTA COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO STOP FOR THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. AS FAR AS HE IS CONCERNED, THIS IS THE RIGHT TIME TO GO BACK AND FINISH MALTA. AFTER THAT, IT WILL BE THE RIGHT TIME TO GO ON TO AN ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE. THERE WE WILL ALL FIND THE ANSWER TO WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE INTERNAL NATIONALISTS AND HOW TO CONVERT THE MILITARY STRUGGLE INTO A POLITICAL ONE.

7. AMBASSADOR YOUNG REMARKED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT NKOMO WAS PRE-PARED TO SWITCH TO A POLITICAL STRUGGLE AT THE PRESENT TIME. WHAT ABOUT MUGABE AND ZANU? WAS NYERERE SATISFIED THAT THEY WOULD EVER TURN AWAY FROM ARMED STRUGGLE? NYERERE SAID: "YES. WE ARE TELLING THEM THIS IS A VERY GOOD TIME TO DO SO, SINCE MUZOREWA
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AND SITHOLE HAD JOINED THE ENEMY. THEIR POLITICAL POSITION WAS GREATLY STRENGTHENED." I ASKED NYERERE HOW LONG HE THOUGHT HE-- AND WE--HAD TO COPE WITH POLITICAL REALITIES HE DESCRIBED AND HOW HE THOUGHT WE COULD BEST DO SO. HE AVOIDED RESPONDING AS TO TIME, BUT SAID: "OUR FELLOWS (THE PF) ARE READY TO GO TO MEETINGS NOW. YOU MUST GET THE OTHERS (THE INTERNAL NATIONALISTS) READY."

8. NYERERE ADDED THAT FAILURE TO DO THIS WAS FOR THE WEST TO SAY THAT THE A-AP OPTION WAS DEAD AND IT MUST WAIT TO SEE HOW THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT CAME OUT, AND FOR THE FRONT LINE TO SAY THAT THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO WAR. NYERERE HAD GONE OVER EVERYTHING THOROUGHLY WITH "HIS CLIENTS" (THE PF). HE WAS VERY HAPPY WITH THEM. THEY WERE READY TO CLOSE THE GAPS WITH THE UK THAT HAD BEEN RECOGNIZED AT MALTA. HE WAS NOT GOING TO BE PUT ON THE DEFENSE ABOUT HIS CLIENTS--"AT LEAST NOT FOR THE TIME BEING." HIS PLEA TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN IS "LET'S GO ON TOGETHER. OTHERWISE, WE (AFRICA) WILL HAVE TO STAY AT WAR ALONG."

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO WHITE HOUSE.

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O 270715Z MAR 78

FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8085

AMEMBASSY GABORONE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1297

EXDIS

9. COMMENT: NYERERE'S SECOND CONVERSATION WITH US CLEARLY REPRESENTS A RETREAT FROM HIS EARLIER COMMITMENT TO AN ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE A-AP. HE SHOWED NO SURPRISE AT OUR NAGATIE REACTION TO HIS NEW POSITION AND ACCEPTED STATEMENT OF OUR OWN POLITICAL REALITIES WITHOUT DEMUR. UNCHARACTERISTICALLY, HE HAD NO HARSH WORDS FOR THE UK. WHEN I POINTED OUT ALL THAT THE US AND THE UK HAD DONE TO PROVIDE HIM WITH REASSURANCES IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN HIS SUPPORT FOR AN ALL PARTIES CONFERENCE, HE SHOWED NO RESENTMENT. THE TONE OF THE CONVERSATION WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE SHRILL AND DEMANDING ONE OF THE FL COMMUNIQUE (SENT SEPTTEL) AND MORNING MARCH 27 PRESS COVERAGE IN DAR, BUT THE SUBSTANCE WAS ABOUT THE SAME.

10. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NYERERE ALWAYS INTENDED TO DEMAND MORE ONCE HE GOT WHAT HE SAID HE WANTED IN WESTERN STATEMENTS ABOUT THE A-AP AND THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. IT SEEMS LIKELY, THAT HIS SHIFT IS THE RESULT OF A REAL OVERNIGHT CHANGE IN HIS VIEW OF THE
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PRESENT SITUATION. YESTERDAY HE SEEMED TO THINK THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO WIN OVER THE FRONT LINE MEETING TO SUPPORT FOR AN ALL PARTIES CONVERENCE, BUT FOUND TODAY THAT THE IMPRESSION MADE ON THE OTHER FL PRESIDENTS BY THE PF'S APPARENTLY IMPROVED STATE OF UNITY AND WILLINGNESS TO MAKE A DEAL WITH THE UK MADE HIS POSITION UNTENABLE. ALREADY SOMEWHAT OUT ON A LIMB BECAUSE OF HIS CHAMPIONSHIP OF A WESTERN POLITICAL INITIATIVE AND HIS VERY PUBLIC CLOSE INVOLVEMENT WITH AMERICANS (CONGRESSMEN DIGGS AND SOLARZ AND THE TIME GROUP) DURING THE PAST WEEK, NYERERE COULD HAVE DECIDED THAT FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST IT WAS BETTER FOR HIM TO SETTLE FOR CONSENSUS AND PROTECT UNIFIED AFRICAN APPROACH.

1. AS TO WHAT WE DO NOW, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO REMEMBER THAT NYERERE HAS ALWAYS DISPLAYED CONSIDERABLE PATIENCE, EVEN WHEN HE IS DEMANDING PROMPT ACTION. FROM HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH CONGRESSMEN DIGGS AND SOLARZ AND THE TIME GROUP, HE HAS BECOME MORE AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS THE USG FACES THAN WAS THE CASE PREVIOUSLY. FROM YOUNG'S PRESENTATION HE KNOWS WHY WE CANNOT NOW DO AS MUCH AS HE - AND WE - MIGHT HAVE HOPED EARLIER. HIS TRUST IN THE US AND PRESIDENT CARTER REMAINS HIGH AND A NEW SYMPATHY FOR THE UK SEEMS PRESENT.

12. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THE ONLY IMMEDIATE THOUGHT WE WOULD OFFER FROM HERE IS THAT IT MIGHT BE WELL TO SHIAFT TOP BILLING IN OUR EFFORTS TO NAMIBIA, WHICH IS NOW PEAKING AND WHERE WE HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF AGREEMENT WITH NYERERE. WE WILL HAVE A CHANCE TO HEAR MORE ABOUT RHODESIA FROM AFRICA WHEN PRESIDENT CARTER SEES PRESIDENT OBASANJO IN NIGERIA LATER IN THE WEEK. THE ALL PARTIES PROPOSAL COULD BE LEFT ON THE TABLE WITHOUT EITHER ACCEPTING OR REECTING THE MALTA PROLOGUE. AT THE MOMENT, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW THE RHODESIAN WITCHES BREW WOULD BE MADE MUCH MORE NOISOME BY A LITTLE ADDITIONAL SIMMERINIG.

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